Fundamentals

Tolerance and Rights: Living Together Without Demanding Approval

By Daniel Sardá · Published on September 07, 2026

7 min read1,362 words

Living with disagreement means distinguishing approval of ideas from respect for people. Tolerance helps; rights and institutional safeguards provide protection.

We can consider a belief mistaken and still defend the freedom of the person who holds it. That possibility explains the relationship between tolerance and rights: civic tolerance helps us live with differences; rights protect people even when their convictions lack social approval.

Here, tolerance means a willingness to recognize others as people with rights while retaining our own convictions. It is not permission granted by the majority and withdrawn when it feels uncomfortable. The practical question is how to live with disagreement without turning it into a reason to impose our will on someone who thinks differently.

Tolerating, approving and respecting are different things

To approve of an idea is to judge it favorably. To tolerate it is to accept that another person may hold it, even when we consider it false or harmful. Respecting that person means recognizing their dignity and rights; it does not require treating all their arguments as equally valid.

UNESCO connects tolerance with an active recognition of other people's rights. Articles 1.2–1.4 of its declaration explain that practicing tolerance does not require abandoning personal convictions or justifying injustice. This offers a basis for arguing firmly without demanding intellectual obedience. Declaration of Principles on Tolerance.

It helps to clarify what “respect” means in a discussion. If it means listening without humiliating someone and recognizing their freedom, it supports dialogue. If it is used to demand that no one question a doctrine, it turns respect for a person into immunity from criticism for their ideas. That demand would prevent precisely the disagreement that tolerance makes possible.

Nor do we need to pretend we are indifferent. We may have deeply held reasons for rejecting a position, explain them and try to persuade others. Liberal tolerance matters when a difference is significant: agreeing with others rarely tests our willingness to live alongside them.

Key idea: Defending someone's rights does not mean their ideas are true, good or convincing.

Rights do not depend on being liked

Articles 1, 2 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirm equality in dignity and rights, entitlement to rights without distinctions such as religion or political opinion, and equality before the law. These principles support an editorial conclusion: rights are not a reward for agreeing with the majority. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This distinction is crucial for minorities and for anyone who dissents within their own group. If protection depended on acceptance, those who needed it most could lose it as soon as their neighbors, leaders or peers stopped approving of them. Speaking of individual rights places the person at the center as the holder of that protection.

From a classical liberal perspective, freedom of conscience, equality before the law and limits on coercion provide reasons to protect dissenters. This is one interpretation of the problem; recognizing human rights is not exclusive to classical liberalism and draws on diverse traditions and foundations.

Recognizing a right and being able to exercise it

Social tolerance and institutional safeguards serve complementary purposes. An open attitude can make everyday coexistence easier. A safeguard gives people a way to seek protection when that attitude fails: securing an institutional response should not require persuading an aggressor to like us.

Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights requires States parties to take measures to give effect to its rights and provide effective remedies for violations. Unlike the Universal Declaration, the Covenant is a treaty. ICCPR, Article 2.

Yet a written obligation does not prove compliance. We should distinguish three questions: why we defend a right, how the legal system recognizes it, and whether a person can actually exercise it or seek its enforcement. An inaccessible remedy can leave protection on paper; even a cordial society may need checks against arbitrary decisions.

Key idea: Social acceptance can make a right easier to exercise; safeguards must also work when that acceptance is absent.

Limits require more than a label

Calling someone “intolerant” may express a moral judgment, but it does not by itself settle what an authority should do. We need to identify the conduct, the right affected and the reasons for any proposed intervention. Harsh criticism, offensive expression and a threat do not present the same problem.

The Human Rights Committee explains that freedom of expression extends even to deeply offensive speech. It also requires restrictions to have a legal basis, pursue a permitted purpose, and meet the tests of necessity and proportionality: an intervention must be justified and go no further than necessary. These are the Committee's interpretive criteria, not a ruling on every dispute. General Comment No. 34, paragraphs 11, 21–22 and 33–35.

Feeling offended, then, is not enough to conclude that an expression should be prohibited. Nor does invoking freedom settle every question of harm. The analysis must consider what was said, the circumstances and the proposed measure, without treating discomfort or a political label as automatic justification.

Article 20(2) of the Covenant requires a legal prohibition on advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred when it incites discrimination, hostility or violence. That category does not encompass every hurtful remark. ICCPR, Article 20. According to the Committee, this prohibition must also meet Article 19's requirements concerning expression. General Comment No. 34, paragraphs 50–52.

A further distinction matters. Article 18 protects the freedom to hold or adopt a religion or belief without coercion. Paragraph 3 permits restrictions on the manifestation of religion or belief only when prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. ICCPR, Article 18.

We should therefore avoid automatically applying the limits on one right to another. These international standards guide the analysis; determining specific legal consequences requires attention to the applicable legal system and the facts.

Two situations that illustrate the difference

The following examples are hypothetical. They help distinguish types of conduct without classifying them as criminal offenses.

Disagreeing with a belief or preventing its practice

A neighbor considers another family's religion mistaken. He explains his objections in a conversation and declines an invitation to attend a ceremony. There is disagreement, but neither action demands that the family abandon its beliefs.

Now suppose he forcibly blocks the entrance to a peaceful religious gathering to make them give up attending. The problem changes: he is trying to prevent a practice through coercion. Describing the situation as a difference of opinion is no longer enough.

The response is not to force the neighbor to admire that religion, either. The aim is to protect the freedom at stake and examine the specific conduct, while preserving room to criticize or reject the belief.

Challenging an opinion or threatening someone into silence

In a forum, one participant questions a political proposal and another responds by pointing out errors in her arguments. The exchange may be uncomfortable. Freedom of expression protects both participants' contributions; public support will depend on whether their arguments persuade.

If one threatens to assault the other unless she withdraws her opinion, a different kind of pressure emerges: fear is being used to secure silence. Recognizing that difference does not by itself determine a penalty. It does show why protection and an assessment of the facts are needed, instead of simply asking both participants to be more tolerant.

Key idea: In a conflict, identify which conduct seeks to obstruct which freedom. The word “intolerance” cannot replace that assessment.

A useful question before calling for a restriction

When a disagreement turns into a demand for a ban, it is worth pausing: which right is affected, by what conduct, and on what grounds is intervention proposed? We then need to examine whether the response protects that right without unjustifiably restricting another.

The same question helps when someone invokes tolerance to ask that a threat be ignored. Living together does not require approving of every idea or remaining passive in the face of coercion. It requires being able to defend our own convictions while recognizing those who reject them as people whose freedom also deserves protection.