Fundamentals

Liberalism and Freedom of Association: Cooperation with Autonomy

By Daniel Sardá · Published on September 07, 2026

7 min read1,466 words

Associating with others makes projects possible that no one could sustain alone. The liberal case for this freedom requires protecting both group autonomy and the freedom of individual members.

The relationship between liberalism and freedom of association begins with a simple idea: choosing whom to cooperate with is one way of directing your own life. A group can provide the knowledge, resources, or support a person needs to carry out a project. Yet cooperation also creates a tension: how can people build something together without membership becoming a form of subordination?

From a classical liberal perspective, the answer requires protecting both shared initiative and personal autonomy. A group needs room to determine its purposes and rules; each member must remain a free person, including when they disagree or want to leave.

Individual liberty is also exercised with others

Defending individual liberty means recognizing that many freely chosen projects are shared ones. Learning, caring for a shared space, or defending common interests may require an organization. The choice remains personal even when the activity is collective.

Imagine a neighborhood network setting up a library. One person contributes books, another finds premises, and others arrange shifts. By coordinating their efforts, they can offer a service none could sustain alone. Their autonomy grows through mutual commitments: each participant accepts responsibilities that make a valued purpose achievable.

The liberal justification for this initiative rests on people's capacity to choose and cooperate. It does not depend on an authority deciding that the library is the best possible use of their time. Nor does it oblige other neighbors to participate simply because the purpose seems worthwhile.

The same freedom allows very different projects, including rival ones. Defending it requires accepting that others may organize around convictions we do not share, provided they respect the rights of others.

Key idea: Voluntary cooperation expands what people can do when shared commitments respect the autonomy of those who make them.

Forming, joining, and leaving are distinct decisions

An association organizes people around shared interests or purposes. An assembly brings people together for an activity; the two may overlap, but they are not equivalent. The library in our example might hold a meeting to decide its opening hours and remain organized after the meeting ends.

It also helps to distinguish an organization from legal personality: recognition as an entity with legal capacity of its own. The guidelines issued by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Venice Commission cover associations both with and without legal personality. Organizing a group and acquiring a particular legal form are separate matters. See paragraphs 76–81 of their Guidelines on Freedom of Association.

To understand membership, it helps to separate four decisions:

• Forming a group: establishing an organization with others and agreeing on its purposes.
• Joining: applying for membership and accepting its legitimate conditions.
• Staying and participating: carrying out activities under the group's rules, with room for disagreement.
• Leaving or declining to join: deciding that the project no longer fits, or never fit, one's preferences.

Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes peaceful association and rejects forced membership. The guidelines cited above also explicitly recognize the freedom to leave an association. The former is an international declaration; the latter provides regional institutional guidance. Neither, on its own, constitutes a legal code applicable to every membership dispute.

Freedom of membership does not mean automatic admission to any group or an unconditional right to remain. Voluntary associations take many forms, but they share this tension between personal choice and the group's rules.

Cooperation can disperse power

In Democracy in America, Tocqueville explained how associations bring together the efforts of people who have little capacity to act on their own. He also linked the practice of civil association to learning political cooperation. The argument appears in Volume II, Part Two, Chapters V and VII; it can be consulted in Henry Reeve's English translation.

On this reading, associations can offer resources and opportunities for action independent of government. When multiple groups exist, a person has more options for seeking support, making demands, or pursuing initiatives. This plurality is a liberal reason to value civil society, the broader sphere of relationships and organizations in which many associations operate.

This is a possibility, not a guarantee. An organization may concentrate power in its leaders, shut down internal debate, or seek privileges for its members at others' expense. The mere existence of associations does not ensure a tolerant society.

From this liberal perspective, the standard is demanding: independence from public power matters, as does the way a group treats those affected by its decisions. An organization's private status is not enough to establish that all its practices are compatible with liberty.

When a group changes and a member disagrees

Consider a hypothetical cultural club devoted to reading. Its members pay dues and elect a board. Over time, a majority decides to devote part of the budget to film. One member would prefer to preserve the original project.

Disagreement does not, by itself, mean that her freedom has been violated. Joining an association means accepting procedures for making decisions, and those procedures may produce outcomes a member does not want. Personal autonomy does not give each member a permanent veto over shared activities.

At the same time, the majority must respect the rules that define the arrangement members agreed to. Sound organizational practice calls for clarity about who can change the group's purposes, how spending is approved, and what channels exist for challenging a decision. The member needs to be able to distinguish between losing a vote and being subjected to arbitrary action.

If she decides to leave, withdrawal should be distinguished from obligations she has already undertaken. Leaving the club cannot be assumed to erase debts or responsibilities; their precise scope will depend on the agreements and applicable law. The liberal concern here is to prevent those obligations from becoming a pretext for imposing indefinite membership.

Key idea: Accepting shared rules makes collective decisions possible; it does not amount to unlimited consent to every future decision.

Leaving can also be costly. The member might lose friendships, activities she values, or access to a nearby venue. These costs deserve attention, even though they differ from threats or violence. If leaving means facing retaliation, a formal right to resign offers insufficient protection.

Limits require reasons and context

Freedom of association also has legal safeguards. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty that establishes obligations for its States parties, protects association in Article 22, including forming and joining trade unions to defend one's interests. Article 21 separately addresses peaceful assembly. This protection therefore extends beyond volunteering. See the Covenant text, OHCHR.

Article 22 requires restrictions to be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society for specified purposes: national security or public safety, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms of others. It also allows lawful restrictions on members of the armed forces and the police, and preserves the guarantees of the 1948 convention on freedom of association for States bound by it. Invoking one of these purposes does not, by itself, establish that a restriction meets the Covenant's conditions.

A liberal assessment demands reasons for restricting people's peaceful organization. A government's dislike of its critics does not justify suppressing their associations. Yet protecting association does not exempt groups from respecting the rights of others.

Admission illustrates this tension. The OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission guidelines recognize discretion over membership in accordance with an association's rules, subject to the principle of non-discrimination. They do not grant unlimited permission to exclude. Resolving a particular dispute requires examining the type of organization, the reason for its decision, and the relevant legislation.

A similar issue arises with compulsory membership: the liberal defense of the freedom not to belong informs the discussion, but does not establish that every requirement to join a professional body or other organization is unlawful without examining its features. The normative principle and the legal answer serve different purposes.

Membership compatible with autonomy

The objection that liberalism condemns people to isolation loses force in light of these possibilities for cooperation. Personal autonomy can find expression in lasting commitments, solidarity, and shared work. The decisive question is how those ties are formed and sustained.

To assess an association, consider whether its purposes and rules are understandable, whether its leaders are accountable for their decisions, and whether disagreement can be expressed without retaliation. It also matters that leaving is a practical possibility and that outstanding obligations are clearly defined.

Returning to the cultural club, a free relationship allows the majority to develop the project through legitimate procedures while allowing the dissenting member to object or leave without becoming subject to its leaders' control. The quality of that membership becomes clearest when preferences cease to align.