Fundamentals

Liberalism and the Rule of Law: Limiting Power to Protect Liberty

By Daniel Sardá · Published on September 24, 2026

7 min read1,349 words

Liberalism links liberty to power constrained by rules, rights, and checks. The rule of law gives that constraint institutional form.

The relationship between liberalism and the rule of law begins with a simple idea: liberty is not secure when those who govern may act on their own will, even if they came to power through elections. In the liberal tradition, authority must justify its use of coercion and exercise it within known limits. The rule of law gives that requirement institutional form through public rules, enforceable rights, defined powers, and authorities subject to review.

That does not make the two concepts synonymous. Liberalism is a plural political tradition; the rule of law is a principle for organizing and restraining power. They are connected because limiting arbitrariness is necessary if people are to decide, dissent, and pursue their own plans of life with a reasonable degree of security.

Key idea: Liberalism does not propose replacing power with an absence of rules; it requires coercion to be subject to general rules, rights, and effective checks.

What liberalism means by liberty and limited power

Speaking of liberalism as though it were a single doctrine can conceal important disagreements. Its different strands debate what it means to be free, which rights deserve priority protection, and what functions the state should perform. Yet they share a central concern: individual liberty has political priority, and every restriction requires justification.

That premise changes the question we ask about power. It is not enough to know who governs or what ends they declare. We must also ask what they may do, through which procedures, under which limits, and to whom they are accountable. Individual rights—such as freedom of expression, conscience, and association, or protection against arbitrary detention—mark boundaries that authority cannot cross at will.

Limited power is not simply the same as a small state. The size of the budget, economic regulation, and the scope of public services are separate controversies. A state with few functions can act arbitrarily, while one with broader functions can be subject to procedures, checks, and rights. From a classical liberal perspective, the scope of government matters, but its subjection to law is a prior question: no power should be unlimited.

The rule of law is more than having laws

Every modern authority produces rules. Even an arbitrary regime can issue decrees, establish courts, and punish conduct with a degree of formality. That is why the mere existence of laws is not enough to show that the rule of law exists.

According to the United Nations definition, all persons and institutions, including the state itself, must be accountable under laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated. The Venice Commission adds criteria for assessing the idea: legality, legal certainty, prevention of abuse of power, equality before the law, and access to justice.

In practical terms, a rule compatible with the rule of law must be accessible and clear enough to guide conduct. Its application cannot depend on political favor or be changed retroactively to punish someone. Anyone affected must be able to be heard and to appeal to an impartial authority. Rulers, legislators, and public officials are subject to these conditions as well.

Key idea: Legality asks whether an authority acted according to a rule. The rule of law also asks how that rule was made, whether it respects rights, whether it is applied without arbitrariness, and whether it can be challenged.

How a limit becomes a real guarantee

A constitution may proclaim liberties while the institutions responsible for protecting them lack independence. Limits on power become effective only when mechanisms exist that can stop, correct, or remedy an abuse.

Among the most important guarantees are:

• public, general, and relatively stable rules;
• defined powers for each authority;
• separation of powers and mutual checks;
• independent judges and effective access to justice;
• due process before sanctions are imposed; and
• remedies that allow unlawful decisions to be reviewed and repaired.

Separation of powers is not merely an organizational chart. Renaming several offices creates no checks if they all answer to the same command. What matters is that no one body concentrates the power to make rules, enforce them, and decide on its own the disputes it creates. Legislatures also need limits: passing a measure through the proper procedure does not automatically make it respectful of rights.

Judicial review has a delicate function here. It can prevent a majority or an administration from exceeding its powers, but judges too must give reasons for their decisions, respect procedures, and remain accountable within their role. The rule of law does not replace one unbounded authority with another.

Democracy and the rule of law: allies, not equivalents

Democracy primarily answers one question: how do citizens participate in forming political power and making collective decisions? The rule of law answers another: under what rules and limits is that power exercised? A constitutional democracy needs both dimensions.

Elections confer legitimacy to govern, but not permission to do anything. A majority does not become less democratic when it encounters limits; it accepts that the rules of civic life also protect those who voted differently, belong to a minority, or hold unpopular views. At the same time, legal limits need legitimate institutions and mechanisms of accountability so that they do not become a government closed to public scrutiny.

This distinction avoids two errors. The first is to assume that every majority decision is just by definition. The second is to treat the protection of rights as an enemy of democracy. In fact, political participation, legal equality, and public liberties support one another, even when tensions among them require deliberation and institutional design.

An example: when a law preserves arbitrariness

Suppose a legislative majority enacts a rule that prevents members of a group from opening certain businesses, without showing a concrete risk or offering them an effective means of appeal. The measure was voted on, enacted, and published. In a narrow sense, there is a law, and the administration can claim it is merely following it.

But the analysis does not end there. We would need to ask whether the distinction is arbitrary or discriminatory, whether it violates rights, whether the people affected received due process, and whether an independent court can review the decision. If those guarantees are absent, legal form becomes a vehicle for abuse rather than a limit on it.

The same problem arises when an agency penalizes someone without notifying them of the charges, allowing them to present evidence, or offering an appeal. The liberal objection is not that every rule restricts conduct to some extent. It is that coercion must have a public reason, be predictable, respect equality, and remain subject to review.

Key idea: To find out whether power is limited, do not look only at the text of the law. Ask who can challenge a decision, before whom, with what safeguards, and whether the authority actually complies with the result.

How to recognize a rule of law that protects liberty

The relationship between liberalism and the rule of law becomes clearest when we look at what happens when an authority makes a mistake or abuses its power. Can a person know the applicable rule beforehand? Do they receive the reasons for a decision? Do they have a fair hearing? Is there an independent judge? Is the judgment carried out even when it harms the government’s interests?

These questions remind us that written guarantees are indispensable but insufficient. An impeccable constitution can coexist with intimidation, inaccessible delays, or systematic noncompliance. Institutional independence, real access to justice, and the everyday practice of respecting limits matter as much as the wording of those limits.

Liberalism’s contribution to this discussion is not to claim that every law protects liberty or that institutions can eliminate abuse entirely. It is to hold that no one should exercise coercion immune from justification and review. Where rulers, majorities, and administrations are subject to the same public rules they enforce, law ceases to be an order issued by power and begins to serve as a limit on political power.