Fundamentals

Liberalism and Limits on Power: Why Winning Is Not a Blank Check

By Daniel Sardá · Published on September 06, 2026

8 min read1,554 words

Winning an election gives a government authority within defined limits. A fictional fine imposed on a critical publication shows why rights need institutional checks and effective ways to challenge abuses.

Does winning an election allow a government to do whatever it chooses? From a classical liberal perspective, electoral support authorizes a government to exercise certain powers; it does not make every subsequent decision legitimate. The relationship between liberalism and limits on power begins with that distinction between being granted authority and having unrestricted discretion to use it.

Imagine a government elected by a large majority that fines a publication solely for criticizing its record. Its supporters applaud the measure, and the government invokes its popular mandate. The scenario is fictional, but it raises a concrete question: what protects dissenters when those in power have public support for punishing them?

The answer requires connecting rights, rules and practical ways to challenge abuses. Each serves a purpose that the others cannot replace.

An Electoral Mandate Has Limits

Electing a government settles a fundamental question: who receives authority to make public decisions? Another question remains: what may that authority do, and under what conditions? A majority can choose a political program without thereby acquiring the power to strip its opponents of their freedoms.

In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke links political society to consent and argues that even the supreme legislative power is subject to limits. It must act through established laws and pursue the purposes that justify its existence, without exercising arbitrary power over people. This is a philosophical argument about authority, not an account of present-day elections. See chapters VIII and XI, especially §§95 and 134–136 of Locke's text.

This distinction helps explain why liberalism and democracy can complement each other without meaning the same thing. Democracy concerns participation and the formation of government; liberalism requires power over the individual to be justified and limited. The legitimacy of a government's authority does not, by itself, establish the legitimacy of every act it undertakes.

Limits on power should also be distinguished from government functions. A government may take on few tasks yet perform them arbitrarily. The distinction between limited government and a minimal state separates constraints on the exercise of power from the range of activities the state undertakes. Liberals disagree about that range; no answer makes institutional checks unnecessary.

Key idea: Consent to be governed does not give rulers unlimited authority over people's lives.

Rights Allow Dissent Without Permission

In our example, the problem does not disappear if the publication has few readers or is widely disliked. Under the liberal standard guiding this article, the freedom to criticize must also protect those on the losing side of an election. If that freedom depended on pleasing the government, it would be a revocable privilege.

Here we need to distinguish two things. A moral justification explains why a freedom deserves respect. A legal guarantee establishes how it is recognized and what can be done when someone violates it. Defending a right in theory does not automatically create a way to enforce it.

Liberal justifications themselves vary. Locke appeals to natural law, while Mill defends liberty on utilitarian grounds. In chapter I of On Liberty, Mill also warns that the majority can threaten autonomy through both public power and social pressure. His account contains unacceptable historical exclusions rooted in colonialism; it should not be presented as fully egalitarian. The warning about majority pressure remains relevant without accepting those exclusions. See *On Liberty*, chapter I.

The fictional fine involves state coercion: a penalty imposed by public authority. Social disapproval of the publication presents a different problem, operating through different mechanisms. Distinguishing the two avoids treating every instance of criticism among citizens as though it were a government prohibition.

Recognizing rights does not settle every question about responsibility, either. It requires restrictions to have a justification beyond the ruler's convenience or the speaker's unpopularity.

How Limits Become Institutional Safeguards

Suppose the government replies: “The fine is authorized by law.” That makes it necessary to examine both the law and its application. Legal authorization alone does not establish that power is sufficiently constrained.

Public, general rules make it possible to know the conditions governing official action and to challenge selective treatment. Yet a ban on criticizing the government could apply equally to everyone and still violate freedom. A rule's generality does not guarantee that its content respects rights.

It also matters who does what. If the authority offended by the criticism can define the offense, impose the fine and issue the final decision on a challenge to it, that authority holds the means to protect its own interests. Distributing powers seeks to reduce this concentration.

Montesquieu examines the danger of combining legislative, executive and judicial powers, and considers powers to prevent and scrutinize government action. His historical account is not equivalent to contemporary judicial arrangements. It does, however, help distinguish the separation of powers from checks and balances: assigning functions is one thing; enabling authorities to check one another is another. See *The Spirit of the Laws*, XI.6 (French text)/L11/C6).

These safeguards also need independent review and a response capable of correcting a violation. As an institutional reference, the Venice Commission includes legality, prevention of abuse and access to justice among the dimensions of the rule of law. Its Rule of Law Checklist is a tool for evaluating institutions; it does not certify that they work simply because they bear the right names.

The argument developed here connects these elements: rules guide decisions, the distribution of powers makes it harder to concentrate decision-making authority, and review allows decisions to be challenged. None guarantees results on its own. For a fuller discussion of institutional mechanisms, see the article on limits of political power.

Key idea: A right on paper needs a way to challenge violations and authorities capable of giving effect to a remedy.

The Fine Imposed on the Publication, Step by Step

Return to the hypothetical case. The authority must explain what conduct it is penalizing, what power it is exercising and what reasons support its decision. “They criticized us” describes the source of its anger; it is not enough to justify restricting freedom of expression.

In interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Human Rights Committee states that restrictions on freedom of expression must serve permitted purposes and meet requirements of necessity and proportionality. It also states that the fact that an expression is offensive to a public figure is not sufficient to justify penalties. More specifically, it rejects penalizing a media outlet solely for criticizing the government. These standards protect criticism without granting immunity from every form of liability. See §§33–35, 38 and 42 of General Comment No. 34.

The publication needs to be able to challenge both the basis of the fine and its application before an independent body. Presenting arguments would achieve little if the reviewer were required to uphold the original decision. A meaningful safeguard must allow the objection to be examined and appropriate measures to be taken.

Timing also matters in our example: a challenge resolved only after the publication has closed may be insufficient to keep it operating. This illustrates why we need to ask whether a remedy is accessible and effective, as well as whether it formally exists.

The Committee connects effective remedies with ending violations and providing reparation in §§15–17 of General Comment No. 31. This is an interpretation of the obligations of states parties. The specific procedure and available measures depend on the legal system and the case; our hypothetical example does not predict a domestic court ruling or automatic compensation.

Those Who Check Power Must Also Be Accountable

One objection deserves attention: reviewing decisions can delay public action and create deadlock. From the editorial perspective of this article, a sound limit should allow government to act within clearly defined powers while providing timely correction. Adding procedures without improving protection does not meet that standard.

It is also legitimate to ask who checks the reviewers. A judge can make mistakes or exceed their authority. That is why we support defined powers, reasoned decisions and avenues for review where appropriate. Independence requires protection from pressure, together with accountability for the exercise of the role.

There is a real tension when a body without an electoral mandate invalidates a majority decision. The liberal defense of that check depends on its purpose: enforcing legal limits on authority. If it overrides, without justification, political decisions that others have the power to make, it too should be challenged.

Key idea: The liberal standard applies to rulers and reviewers alike: both exercise power and must justify its use.

The Test Is Whether a Minority Can Challenge Power

To assess the opening case, it helps to ask three questions: must the authority justify the fine under rules compatible with rights? Can the publication challenge it before an independent body? Can a favorable decision lead to an effective remedy?

Answering requires examining how institutions work. A constitutional text, a complaints office or an unenforced judgment leaves questions unanswered.

The elected government retains its mandate to govern. The publication retains its freedom to question it. Their ability to coexist, even when criticism irritates the majority, is the concrete test of the limits on power that liberalism defends.