Imagine a small religious community that meets every week. The local authority disapproves of its beliefs but allows the gatherings, considering it better to avoid conflict. Then a new leader takes office and decides that these meetings are no longer acceptable.
Was the community free before that change? Its members could practice their religion, but their security depended on someone else's will. They had no guarantee they could invoke against an authority that decided to ban their meetings.
The relationship between liberal tolerance and freedom comes into focus through that distinction. A willingness to live alongside people who think differently matters; so does their ability to exercise their rights when that willingness is absent. From a liberal perspective, disapproval of a belief is not enough to justify using power to prevent people from professing it.
Tolerating, permitting, and recognizing a right
In everyday life, tolerating usually means accepting something we dislike or consider wrong. If an idea leaves us indifferent, there is little disagreement to contend with. If we approve of it, we have no need to make the effort of tolerating it either.
In his analysis of toleration for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Rainer Forst distinguishes a conception based on permission from one grounded in respect among equals. In the first, an authority accepts a minority on terms the authority sets. In the second, disagreement coexists with recognition of equal moral and political standing. These conceptions can coexist; they are not stages in an inevitable historical progression.
This helps distinguish three levels. Interpersonal tolerance is a willingness to live with others. Discretionary permission is a concession dependent on those in power. A right gives its holder a claim to protection that does not depend on whether their ideas find favor.
Not every administrative permit is an arbitrary favor: permits can be governed by rules and safeguards. Here, we mean permission whose continuation depends on an authority's preferences—the very condition that makes the community in our example vulnerable.
Key idea: Recognizing another person's freedom does not mean approving of their beliefs. It means that disapproval alone does not justify subjecting them to coercion.
Consider two neighbors who disagree about religion. One may regard the other's convictions as false, argue against them, and decline to take part in their celebrations. Respecting the other's freedom does not require a change of opinion. It does require recognizing the neighbor's equal right to live according to their convictions, within limits that can be justified to everyone.
Safeguards for when goodwill fails
Return to the community. A promise from the new leader to be more understanding would ease its situation but leave the underlying problem intact: its meetings would still depend on that leader's benevolence. The liberal argument points toward a different kind of protection.
As an institutional proposal, that protection requires general rules, authorities bound by them, and procedures for challenging a ban. If an authority restricts a gathering, it should have to give reasons open to scrutiny, tied to the conduct involved and the rights affected. Its judgment that a religion is false should not decide the case.
Nor does invoking a “right” settle every conflict. Two activities may interfere with one another, and a restriction may need justification. The difference lies in who must give reasons and which reasons can count: citizens should not have to prove that they deserve a leader's sympathy to retain their freedom.
Safeguards and a tolerant culture serve different purposes. Our editorial position is that both should be cultivated together. A written rule needs people and institutions willing to enforce it; peaceful coexistence needs protection for the moments when it breaks down.
Pressure also exists outside the state. In Chapter I of On Liberty, John Stuart Mill warns of social tyranny and the imposition of prevailing opinions. His warning directs attention beyond official prohibitions, without equating every instance of criticism or rejection with a loss of freedom.
Conscience and its public expression
Freedom of conscience protects a crucial sphere: the ability to form, hold, or change convictions. Its connection with tolerance becomes clear when someone tries to compel belief through punishment.
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke argues that force cannot produce sincere religious conviction and distinguishes civil interests from the salvation of the soul. He maintains that religious differences do not justify depriving people of civil rights. His defense nevertheless included explicit exclusions, among them atheists and communities subject to another prince. It would be inaccurate to attribute to him the universal equality we might defend today.
The distinction between conviction and conduct remains useful. Believing something, saying it, and acting on it are related dimensions, but they raise different questions. A conviction may find expression in a gathering, a book, or a campaign; these expressions involve other people and require attention to context.
Freedom of expression allows people to share beliefs and subject them to criticism. If the community could keep its faith only in silence, central activities of its shared life would remain unprotected. At the same time, its members could not demand that others silence their objections.
Key idea: Protecting a belief means protecting the person who holds it; it does not place the belief beyond discussion.
What about those who want to end tolerance?
The objection is serious: someone may use freedom to try to take it away from others. An open society needs to be able to defend people who are threatened. But calling an opponent “intolerant” does not settle which response is justified.
We need to examine what that person does, in what context, and how it affects others. Harsh criticism of a religion is not equivalent to forcibly blocking access to its meeting place. Nor does outrage over an opinion, by itself, establish that the opinion should be banned. This distinction helps guide judgment; it is not a legal rule that can simply be applied in every country.
In Chapter I of On Liberty, Mill proposes preventing harm to others as a justification for coercion, as opposed to forcing someone to act for their own good. At the beginning of Chapter III, he also shows that an opinion in print and the same opinion expressed before an agitated crowd may warrant different judgments. His argument requires attention to context; it does not supply a code that automatically settles every controversy.
From the perspective defended here, the response should be tied to the conduct it seeks to stop. A doctrine we consider mistaken leaves room for rebuttal and voluntary association. Attempts to use force to prevent others from exercising their freedom provide a different reason to intervene and protect them.
That intervention also needs safeguards. Those intervening should have to explain the specific risk, justify the scope of the measure, and allow it to be challenged before an impartial body. Giving those in power an open-ended mandate to pursue “bad ideas” would reproduce the dependence we were trying to overcome.
Key idea: Defending tolerance requires protecting people against coercion and demanding reasons from those who exercise the power to restrict their freedom.
Responsibility in the face of disagreement begins with distinguishing these situations. Freedom does not promise an absence of critical responses, and responsibility does not make every reaction to an opinion legitimate.
The test of a change in authority
The community in our opening example would be in a different position if it could challenge the ban, demand reasons, and obtain protection under equal rules. It might still encounter hostile neighbors or leaders who disapproved of its faith. Its freedom, however, would no longer rest exclusively on those people's patience.
That is the test that distinguishes a discretionary concession from a protected freedom: what someone can claim after losing the favor of those in power. Goodwill makes living together easier; a right becomes especially important on the day that goodwill disappears.
Share