Cyberwarfare: What It Is, How It Works, and Its Limits

A digital operation can disrupt essential services, but not every cyberattack amounts to war. Its effects, attribution, and context help explain the difference.

By Daniel Sardá · Published on

7 min read1,507 words

In this article · 8 sections

Cyberwarfare is the use of operations against computer systems as means or methods of armed conflict. In public discussion, the term is also used more broadly to describe digital hostilities between political actors. That difference matters: an attack on a network, even a serious one, does not by itself establish that a war exists.

To understand an operation, we need to ask what effects it produced, who carried it out, and in what context. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) distinguishes everyday cyber operations from those connected to armed conflicts, to which the rules of international humanitarian law apply.

The stakes are concrete. A network may carry a family's communications, support a business, or provide services to a hospital. Understanding cyberwarfare means looking at military decisions and at the people who depend on those systems.

How a digital operation can cause harm beyond a screen

A cyber operation targets computer systems, networks, or data. It may seek to obtain information, alter how a service works, or prevent users from accessing it. Its consequences depend on the system affected and the function it serves.

Consider a network used to coordinate an essential service. If it becomes unavailable, the problem does not end with the equipment: the disruption may make it harder to care for people who need that service. This hypothetical example shows how a digital interruption can have material and social effects.

Civilian and military networks can also share infrastructure. An action directed at a military capability may affect civilian users or have consequences in other countries. The ICRC warns of these risks to infrastructure and services on which the population depends.

That does not mean every intrusion causes physical damage or every disruption is equally serious. Assessing an incident requires identifying what stopped working, for how long, and with what consequences for people.

Before an incident, a digital threat model can help identify which systems need protection and the risks they face.

Key idea: A digital operation's effects need not stay online. Its severity depends on what it affects and the consequences it causes.

Who acts and how responsibility is established

Operations can involve state forces, armed groups, and civilians. But identifying the responsible party usually requires more than finding the computer from which activity appears to originate.

There are three distinct questions. Technical attribution seeks to reconstruct who conducted an operation and how. Legal attribution examines whether conduct can be attributed to a state under the relevant rules. Political attribution is the decision to publicly identify a responsible party. Canada's official position on international law in cyberspace distinguishes these dimensions.

Finding infrastructure used in an operation can provide a clue, but it is not enough on its own to establish state responsibility. Nor does a public accusation automatically amount to a judicial finding.

The difficulty of attribution does not mean abandoning all conclusions. It means explaining who makes a claim, what evidence supports it, and the level of confidence attached to it. If some evidence is not public, readers should be able to recognize that limit.

Cyberwarfare, cybercrime, and espionage: Where they differ

The word cyberattack broadly describes hostile action against systems or data. On its own, it says little about the purpose, perpetrator, or connection to an armed conflict. Everyday use of “attack” also does not necessarily match its legal meaning under humanitarian law.

Other categories help organize the analysis:

  • Cybercrime: Criminal activity carried out through or directed against digital systems. Cyber extortion may seek financial gain without being part of a war.
  • Cyber espionage: The acquisition of information through digital means. Espionage does not by itself amount to armed conflict; its legal assessment requires examining the conduct and applicable rules.
  • Cyber defense: The protection of systems and capabilities against digital threats. The term describes a protective purpose, but does not by itself settle the legality of each measure.
  • Cyberwarfare: In the sense used here, the use of cyber operations in an armed conflict.

These categories can overlap. An intrusion intended to obtain information may prepare the way for a later operation. Criminal conduct may also be connected to hostilities. Classification depends on the facts and context, not just the tool used.

Key idea: A state operation is not automatically an act of war, and espionage does not become war simply because it is hostile or sophisticated.

What limits does international law establish?

Legal analysis requires separating three questions: the legality of resorting to force, the conditions for self-defense, and the rules protecting people during armed conflict.

Use of force and self-defense

Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in international relations on the terms it sets out. Article 51, described in the Security Council's Repertoire, recognizes the right of self-defense if an armed attack occurs.

Use of force and armed attack are not interchangeable terms. Nor does the Charter contain an automatic rule allowing every computer incident to be classified on the basis of a service disruption.

The United Kingdom's 2021 position considers scale and effects when examining cyber operations under these rules. This is a state's position that helps explain the analysis; it does not settle every interpretive dispute. Establishing that a blackout occurred is not enough to conclude that it authorizes a military response.

Protecting civilians during hostilities

International humanitarian law (IHL) regulates the conduct of hostilities and protects those who do not take part in them. As the ICRC explains, it also applies to cyber operations connected to an armed conflict. Applying it does not mean that starting a war was lawful.

Its rules include distinction between military objectives and civilians or civilian objects, proportionality, and precautions in attack. Proportionality does not require both sides to suffer equal harm: it prohibits attacks in which expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. The ICRC explains these limits for digital operations.

With shared infrastructure, the analysis must consider its functions and the foreseeable effects on civilians. Military use does not remove the need to assess the consequences for other users.

Debates persist over issues such as the protection of civilian data and the classification of situations involving exclusively digital violence. That uncertainty does not make cyberspace a lawless place. Nor does it mean that every legal threshold has been settled.

Key idea: Rules on when force may be used and rules on how hostilities are conducted answer different questions. Civilian protection matters regardless of who started the conflict.

KA-SAT: Applying these distinctions

On February 24, 2022, the KA-SAT satellite communications network suffered a partial outage that affected users in Ukraine and other European countries. Viasat, the affected company, documented the incident in its March 2022 report.

The target of the incident matters: Viasat found no evidence that the satellite itself had been compromised. Describing it as the destruction of a satellite would introduce a claim the report does not support.

In May 2022, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) attributed the attack to Russia with a level of confidence described as almost certain. This is an official British attribution; it should be read with its source and confidence level in mind, not as a judicial ruling.

The case helps distinguish the documented effect—the service disruption—from the official attribution and the legal assessment. Its context shows the relevance of digital operations in an armed conflict, but does not remove the need to analyze separately which rules apply to each act. Nor does it, on its own, establish that the isolated incident crossed a particular legal threshold.

Digital security and public accountability

From a liberal perspective, protecting essential services, property, and personal communications requires attention both to threats and to the powers used in response. The severity of an incident does not by itself justify any form of surveillance or restriction of rights.

The editorial principle that follows is to demand justified measures, defined limits, and accountability. A security response should be able to explain what it protects, why particular powers are needed, and how its effects on privacy and civilian activity are overseen.

When reading a report about “cyberwarfare,” keep three questions in mind: what harm has been established, to whom is it attributed, and how is it connected to an armed conflict? If answers are missing, the label says less than it appears to. If answers are available, they allow a more precise discussion of responsibility and civilian protection, without losing sight of the people who depend on the affected network.

About the author

Daniel Sardá is an SEO Specialist, a university-level technician in Foreign Trade from Universidad Simón Bolívar, and editor of Libertatis Venezuela. He writes on liberalism, political economy, institutions, propaganda and individual liberty from an independent, non-partisan perspective.

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