Current Affairs

Report: internal tensions within Chavismo in April 2026

By Daniel Sardá · April 24, 2026

Summary

In the final days of April 2026, there has been a simultaneous deployment of Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez and Diosdado Cabello across different routes of the Great Pilgrimage for a Venezuela without sanctions, combined with economic, legislative and judicial announcements from the center of power. In parallel, Mario Silva broadcast a program on April 19 marked by direct ideological confrontation, in which he attacked the line of negotiation with the United States, the rapprochement with the IMF/World Bank, the reference to a “market economy” and the role of OFAC over the Venezuelan economy. He also framed the new U.S. diplomat John Barrett as part of an operation to “disarm” and “reorder” the Bolivarian Revolution without firing a shot.

The most politically delicate point in Silva’s message is that he reformulates the political authorship of January 3: he rejects the idea that the episode can be reduced to “extremism” and, in an explicit passage, contrasts that version with another in which the responsible actor would be “U.S. imperialism.” In that same section, he mentions María Corina Machado rhetorically in order to deny that the event can be explained as if she —or he himself— had “come in helicopters.” In other words: his message shifts the focus from abstract or internal blame toward direct attribution to the United States.

The most prudent reading is that there is, at minimum, a public divergence of line inside Chavismo: while Delcy, Jorge and Diosdado lead a territorial campaign around national unity, sanctions, justice and management, Mario Silva places the emphasis on treason, capitulation, markets, the IMF, OFAC, “silent invasion” and preparation for confrontation.

1. Delcy Rodríguez: political, territorial and economic route

Delcy Rodríguez launched the Great Pilgrimage for a Venezuela free of sanctions on April 20 in Zulia, presenting it as a national campaign for peace, concord and coexistence. From there, she combined an anti-sanctions discourse with regional management announcements, including her decision to take the lead alongside the governor in addressing sensitive state problems, among them the electricity system. This initial phase was reflected in EFE’s coverage of the launch of the pilgrimage and in the MIPPCI note on the launch in Zulia.

After that launch, Delcy moved to Falcón, where on April 21 and 22 she led meetings with social, business and political sectors, participated in the Médanos de Coro, pushed messages of national unity and called on all sectors to join the pilgrimage. In that phase she also announced a presidential commission to address public services and a flagship project in Coro, including the recovery of the Muelle de Muaco, as reported by MIPPCI from Coro and the Médanos.

In parallel with the territorial tour, Delcy activated an economic and institutional agenda. On April 22, she said she had spoken with Kristalina Georgieva to seek Venezuela’s access to $5 billion in IMF Special Drawing Rights, a line reported by Reuters on the IMF–Venezuela link and by Swissinfo on the SDR request.

On April 23, she installed a commission for the evaluation and classification of public assets, with the stated objective of prioritizing patrimony, increasing productivity and separating strategic, productive or liquidatable assets, according to EFE’s report on the public assets commission. That same day, her government opened a Great National Consultation on criminal justice reform, in a move that combined street politics with institutional reordering.

2. Jorge Rodríguez: territorial column, sanctions, racism and criminal justice

Jorge Rodríguez announced on April 14 that he would join the Great National Pilgrimage for the lifting of sanctions, and in the following days he assumed a role as territorial and parliamentary operator within that campaign, as shown by the National Assembly announcement of his incorporation into the pilgrimage.

The National Assembly placed him on April 20 in Guayana, calling on businesspeople and religious actors to join the demand for an end to sanctions. The note also pointed to the attempt to lower partisan flags and raise a single national narrative against the blockade, according to the parliamentary coverage from Guayana.

On April 23, the National Assembly reported him in Barquisimeto, Lara, accompanying the pilgrimage and stating that the mobilization seeks to make “all of Venezuela” heard “with one voice” against sanctions. That same day, he welcomed the launch of the Great National Consultation on Criminal Justice Reform, defended the review of ordinary criminal justice and raised the idea of expanding mechanisms to address cases not covered by the amnesty law, according to the note on his stop in Lara and the note on the criminal justice consultation.

In addition, Jorge Rodríguez incorporated another political line: rejection of racism and hatred. The National Assembly published an April 20 intervention in which he called for eradicating any form of hatred and fascism, in a context marked by the controversy in Madrid over racist insults directed at Delcy Rodríguez, as reflected in the parliamentary note on his anti-racism message.

3. Diosdado Cabello: his own route, mobilization and popular economy

Diosdado Cabello is leading another route of the same pilgrimage. EFE’s coverage of the national launch placed him in Táchira at the beginning of the deployment, and MIPPCI reported him in Trujillo on April 21, from the Monument to the Virgin of Peace, leading a caravan and a political act against sanctions.

Cabello combined the anti-sanctions axis with a more concrete socio-economic message: he argued that recovering family income is a central task of the government and attributed part of the deterioration of people’s resources to inflation and the “perverse game with the currency.” He also said that “everyone who wants to join will be welcome,” seeking to broaden the support base of the pilgrimage. That tone appears both in MIPPCI’s coverage from Trujillo and in the Swissinfo/EFE note on the motorcyclist caravan led by Cabello.

4. John Barrett: diplomatic replacement amid political escalation

The replacement of Laura Dogu by John Barrett is one of the key pieces of context. The change was reported on April 15, when it was announced that Dogu was leaving the mission leadership and Barrett would take over as the new U.S. chargé d’affaires for Venezuela. El País on the replacement in the U.S. mission situated Barrett after his time in Guatemala, where his work was surrounded by controversy over alleged interference in the process of selecting magistrates; Anadolu on the Dogu–Barrett change also reported the replacement.

That replacement matters because Mario Silva turns Barrett into one of the axes of his April 19 intervention: he does not speak of Barrett as a simple diplomat, but as the operator who would come to “impose judges,” “impose rectors,” “impose the line” in the legislature and place himself above the executive.

5. Mario Silva: April 19 as an ideological position-taking

5.1. Against negotiation with the United States

In his April 19 program, Mario Silva argued that there is no real possibility of negotiating with the United States and that believing otherwise is foolish. From there, he presents Barrett as part of a U.S. operation to “disarm” the Bolivarian Revolution, “finish it off” and impose changes in the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, the legislature and the executive.

5.2. Against the “market economy,” the IMF and OFAC

Silva directly attacked the idea that Venezuela should move toward a “market economy,” saying that the expression “horrified” him and contradicted the PSUV’s “red book” and Chávez’s legacy. In the same block, he questioned the return to the IMF and the World Bank, compared it to a regression toward 1989, and rejected the idea that Venezuelan resources should be subject to OFAC.

5.3. The mention of María Corina Machado and January 3

One of the most important passages of the program comes when Silva criticizes the idea that what happened on January 3 can be summarized as a consequence of “extremism.” From there, he launches a sequence of questions: “Who bombed us? Who attacked us? Who kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores?” His answer is direct: “U.S. imperialism.”

In that same section, he adds a politically significant phrase: “Or is it that María Corina or Mario Silva came here riding in helicopters and attacked here?” The logic of the passage is clear: to shift the explanation away from abstract or internal blame toward direct attribution to the United States, while also denying that the operation can be reduced to the action of María Corina Machado.

5.4. “The stinking ones,” internal criticism and preparation for confrontation

Silva presents himself as part of a sector under pressure within Chavismo itself. He says that those who debate these issues are now treated as “stinking ones,” accuses others of blind obedience and describes a campaign to crush anyone who confronts, questions or causes discomfort. His political response is even harder: he argues that “war is inevitable,” that collective preparation is needed between the people and the Armed Forces, and that concessions facilitating the “silent invasion” cannot continue.

5.5. The situation of his political and media space

At the personal and media level, Mario Silva also said that his team is “without resources,” “reduced” and “practically scraping the bottom of the pot,” and warned that he does not know how much longer they will be able to continue broadcasting. He does not present this only as a financial problem: he inserts it into a narrative of political isolation, marginalization and ideological resistance.

6. Valentín Santana and La Piedrita

What is solidly documented about Valentín Santana is his historical role as leader of the La Piedrita colectivo in 23 de Enero. Reuters on Chavista colectivos and La Piedrita described him years ago as a figure from a radical Chavista colectivo; the IACHR on violence and armed groups in Venezuela included La Piedrita among violent groups acting with state tolerance or acquiescence; and VOA on Chávez, Valentín Santana and La Piedrita recalled that Chávez publicly distanced himself from Santana in 2009, when he called for his arrest after threats against opponents.

There is also analytical literature that identifies La Piedrita as one of the best-known and most controversial colectivos in the Chavista ecosystem, with a record of conflict with other groups, threats, arrest warrants and a historically ambivalent relationship with formal power, as explained by International Crisis Group in its report on violence and politics in Venezuela.

By contrast, regarding recent high-standard verifiable statements by Valentín Santana during this same week, there does not appear to be a solid source comparable to a formal interview, press conference or institutional statement. What does circulate are clips and excerpts on social media attributed to him, with phrases against the “interim government,” against the “Yankees” and in defense of armed or territorial resistance, but those pieces do not, by themselves, have the same documentary robustness as the rest of this report.

7. General political reading

The public sequence of this week leaves three clear layers.

First, Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez and Diosdado Cabello appear coordinated in a national street campaign against sanctions, with Delcy also adding announcements on the IMF, public assets and criminal justice.

Second, Mario Silva entered with a discourse that does not accompany that narrative of management and unity, but rather tensions it from the hard-left Chavista side: he denounces markets, the IMF, OFAC, pacts, “realpolitik,” concessions and U.S. tutelage.

Third, the replacement of Laura Dogu by John Barrett gives Silva a concrete name to which he can attribute this new phase of pressure.

The most prudent conclusion is that there is a public confrontation of line inside Chavismo, although there is still not enough open evidence to speak of a formal structural rupture. The pilgrimage by Delcy/Jorge/Diosdado and Mario Silva’s program do not clash only in style; they clash in substance: one side is building legitimacy around sanctions, management, criminal justice consultation and unity; the other is saying that the real problem is ideological and strategic capitulation before the United States and that January 3 must be read as direct imperial aggression, not as “extremism” or as a simple operation attributable to María Corina Machado.