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Current Affairs

Updated report: recent movements within Chavismo, internal tensions and the hard-line anti-imperialist line — April 2026

By Daniel Sardá · Published on · Updated on

20 min read4,196 words

In this article · 26 sections

Updated report on the campaign against sanctions, Mario Silva’s hard-line criticism, the context of Valentín Santana and La Piedrita, and signs of public friction inside Chavismo.

Summary

In the final days of April 2026, there has been a simultaneous deployment of Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez and Diosdado Cabello across different routes of the Great Pilgrimage for a Venezuela without sanctions, combined with economic, legislative and judicial announcements from the center of power. In parallel, Mario Silva broadcast a program on April 19 marked by direct ideological confrontation, in which he attacked the line of negotiation with the United States, the rapprochement with the IMF/World Bank, the reference to a “market economy” and the role of OFAC over the Venezuelan economy. He also framed the new U.S. diplomat John Barrett as part of an operation to “disarm” and “reorder” the Bolivarian Revolution without firing a shot.

The most politically delicate point in Silva’s message is that he reformulates the political authorship of January 3: he rejects the idea that the episode can be reduced to “extremism” and, in an explicit passage, contrasts that version with another in which the responsible actor would be “U.S. imperialism.” In that same section, he mentions María Corina Machado rhetorically in order to deny that the event can be explained as if she —or he himself— had “come in helicopters.” In other words: his message shifts the focus from abstract or internal blame toward direct attribution to the United States.

The additional context of Valentín Santana and the La Piedrita colectivo reinforces the reading that there is a radical Chavista flank, historically ambivalent toward formal power, that can discursively coincide with Silva around three ideas: rejection of a supposed “surrender” of the country, direct identification of the United States as the main enemy and defense of territorial or armed resistance. However, there is not enough public evidence to affirm a formal alliance between Mario Silva and Valentín Santana.

The most prudent reading is that there is, at minimum, a public divergence of line inside Chavismo: while Delcy, Jorge and Diosdado lead a territorial campaign around national unity, sanctions, justice and management, Mario Silva places the emphasis on treason, capitulation, markets, the IMF, OFAC, “silent invasion” and preparation for confrontation.

1. Delcy Rodríguez: political, territorial and economic route

Delcy Rodríguez launched the Great Pilgrimage for a Venezuela free of sanctions on April 20 in Zulia, presenting it as a national campaign for peace, concord and coexistence. From there, she combined an anti-sanctions discourse with regional management announcements, including her decision to take the lead alongside the governor in addressing sensitive state problems, among them the electricity system. This initial phase was reflected in EFE’s coverage of the launch of the pilgrimage and in the MIPPCI note on the launch in Zulia.

After that launch, Delcy moved to Falcón, where on April 21 and 22 she led meetings with social, business and political sectors, participated in the Médanos de Coro, pushed messages of national unity and called on all sectors to join the pilgrimage. In that phase she also announced a presidential commission to address public services and a flagship project in Coro, including the recovery of the Muelle de Muaco, as reported by MIPPCI from Coro and the Médanos.

In parallel with the territorial tour, Delcy activated an economic and institutional agenda. On April 22, she said she had spoken with Kristalina Georgieva to seek Venezuela’s access to $5 billion in IMF Special Drawing Rights, a line reported by Reuters on the IMF–Venezuela link and by Swissinfo on the SDR request.

On April 23, she installed a commission for the evaluation and classification of public assets, with the stated objective of prioritizing patrimony, increasing productivity and separating strategic, productive or liquidatable assets, according to EFE’s report on the public assets commission. That same day, her government opened a Great National Consultation on criminal justice reform, in a move that combined street politics with institutional reordering.

2. Jorge Rodríguez: territorial column, sanctions, racism and criminal justice

Jorge Rodríguez announced on April 14 that he would join the Great National Pilgrimage for the lifting of sanctions, and in the following days he assumed a role as territorial and parliamentary operator within that campaign, as shown by the National Assembly announcement of his incorporation into the pilgrimage.

The National Assembly placed him on April 20 in Guayana, calling on businesspeople and religious actors to join the demand for an end to sanctions. The note also pointed to the attempt to lower partisan flags and raise a single national narrative against the blockade, according to the parliamentary coverage from Guayana.

On April 23, the National Assembly reported him in Barquisimeto, Lara, accompanying the pilgrimage and stating that the mobilization seeks to make “all of Venezuela” heard “with one voice” against sanctions. That same day, he welcomed the launch of the Great National Consultation on Criminal Justice Reform, defended the review of ordinary criminal justice and raised the idea of expanding mechanisms to address cases not covered by the amnesty law, according to the note on his stop in Lara and the note on the criminal justice consultation.

In addition, Jorge Rodríguez incorporated another political line: rejection of racism and hatred. The National Assembly published an April 20 intervention in which he called for eradicating any form of hatred and fascism, in a context marked by the controversy in Madrid over racist insults directed at Delcy Rodríguez, as reflected in the parliamentary note on his anti-racism message.

3. Diosdado Cabello: his own route, mobilization and popular economy

Diosdado Cabello is leading another route of the same pilgrimage. EFE’s coverage of the national launch placed him in Táchira at the beginning of the deployment, and MIPPCI reported him in Trujillo on April 21, from the Monument to the Virgin of Peace, leading a caravan and a political act against sanctions.

Cabello combined the anti-sanctions axis with a more concrete socio-economic message: he argued that recovering family income is a central task of the government and attributed part of the deterioration of people’s resources to inflation and the “perverse game with the currency.” He also said that “everyone who wants to join will be welcome,” seeking to broaden the support base of the pilgrimage. That tone appears both in MIPPCI’s coverage from Trujillo and in the Swissinfo/EFE note on the motorcyclist caravan led by Cabello.

Venezuela’s return to links with the IMF and the World Bank also generated criticism within Chavismo itself. In that context, Diosdado Cabello publicly responded to internal questioning of that line, confirming that the unease was not limited to a single isolated voice. Infobae’s coverage of criticism inside Chavismo over the return to the IMF is useful for documenting that tension.

4. John Barrett: diplomatic replacement amid political escalation

The replacement of Laura Dogu by John Barrett is one of the key pieces of context. The change was reported on April 15, when it was announced that Dogu was leaving the mission leadership and Barrett would take over as the new U.S. chargé d’affaires for Venezuela. El País on the replacement in the U.S. mission situated Barrett after his time in Guatemala, where his work was surrounded by controversy over alleged interference in the process of selecting magistrates; Anadolu on the Dogu–Barrett change also reported the replacement.

That replacement matters because Mario Silva turns Barrett into one of the axes of his April 19 intervention: he does not speak of Barrett as a simple diplomat, but as the operator who would come to “impose judges,” “impose rectors,” “impose the line” in the legislature and place himself above the executive. In Silva’s logic, Barrett does not represent only an administrative change in the U.S. mission, but the symbol of a new phase of pressure and political intervention.

5. Mario Silva: April 19 as an ideological position-taking

5.1. Against negotiation with the United States

In his April 19 program, Mario Silva argued that there is no real possibility of negotiating with the United States and that believing otherwise is foolish. From there, he presents Barrett as part of a U.S. operation to “disarm” the Bolivarian Revolution, “finish it off” and impose changes in the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, the legislature and the executive.

5.2. Against the “market economy,” the IMF and OFAC

Silva directly attacked the idea that Venezuela should move toward a “market economy,” saying that the expression “horrified” him and contradicted the PSUV’s “red book” and Chávez’s legacy. In the same block, he questioned the return to the IMF and the World Bank, compared it to a regression toward 1989, and rejected the idea that Venezuelan resources should be subject to OFAC.

5.3. The mention of María Corina Machado and January 3

One of the most important passages of the program comes when Silva criticizes the idea that what happened on January 3 can be summarized as a consequence of “extremism.” From there, he launches a sequence of questions: “Who bombed us? Who attacked us? Who kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and Cilia Flores?” His answer is direct: “U.S. imperialism.”

In that same section, he adds a politically significant phrase: “Or is it that María Corina or Mario Silva came here riding in helicopters and attacked here?” The logic of the passage is clear: to shift the explanation away from abstract or internal blame toward direct attribution to the United States, while also denying that the operation can be reduced to the action of María Corina Machado.

This reading is reinforced by later statements by Silva collected by Canarias Semanal on Mario Silva, January 3 and the defense of sovereignty, where he insists that blaming “extremism” for the January 3 attack “is not true” and that those who bombed were “the gringos.”

5.4. “The stinking ones,” internal criticism and preparation for confrontation

Silva presents himself as part of a sector under pressure within Chavismo itself. He says that those who debate these issues are now treated as “stinking ones,” accuses others of blind obedience and describes a campaign to crush anyone who confronts, questions or causes discomfort. His political response is even harder: he argues that “war is inevitable,” that collective preparation is needed between the people and the Armed Forces, and that concessions facilitating the “silent invasion” cannot continue.

5.5. The situation of his political and media space

At the personal and media level, Mario Silva also said that his team is “without resources,” “reduced” and “practically scraping the bottom of the pot,” and warned that he does not know how much longer they will be able to continue broadcasting. He does not present this only as a financial problem: he inserts it into a narrative of political isolation, marginalization and ideological resistance.

5.6. Immediate background: withdrawal of bodyguards and sense of marginalization

Silva’s unease did not begin on April 19. On March 29, 2026, El Pitazo reported that Mario Silva confirmed the withdrawal of his security detail. That coverage includes a significant phrase: “I am not an enemy, comrades. They are considering me an enemy, and I am not an enemy.”

That background helps contextualize the tone of April 19: Silva does not appear only as an ideological commentator upset by an economic decision, but as a figure who had already been denouncing signs of isolation, loss of protection and hostile treatment within the Chavista camp itself.

The interview collected by Canarias Semanal broadens that framework: Silva returns to his differences, the reading of January 3, the role of OFAC, laws favorable to the United States, the IMF and the absence of an order for national defense. This shows that the April 19 program is part of a sustained discursive line, not an isolated episode.

6. Valentín Santana and La Piedrita

6.1. General profile

What is solidly documented about Valentín Santana is his historical role as leader of the La Piedrita colectivo in 23 de Enero. Reuters on Chavista colectivos and La Piedrita described him years ago as a figure from a radical Chavista colectivo; the IACHR on violence and armed groups in Venezuela included La Piedrita among violent groups acting with state tolerance or acquiescence; and VOA on Chávez, Valentín Santana and La Piedrita recalled that Chávez publicly distanced himself from Santana in 2009, when he called for his arrest after threats against opponents.

There is also analytical literature that identifies La Piedrita as one of the best-known and most controversial colectivos in the Chavista ecosystem, with a record of conflict with other groups, threats, arrest warrants and a historically ambivalent relationship with formal power, as explained by International Crisis Group in its report on violence and politics in Venezuela.

6.2. Chávez publicly called for his arrest in 2009

The most important precedent for understanding Santana’s relationship with Chavista power is that Hugo Chávez publicly called for his arrest in 2009. The Committee to Protect Journalists on Valentín Santana’s threats documented that, after public threats against media outlets and political leaders, Chávez condemned those actions, described them as terrorist and, according to press reports, ordered his detention.

This episode matters because it shows that La Piedrita has not simply been a disciplined appendage of formal power. Its relationship with the Chavista state has been historically ambivalent: ideological affinity, use of Chavista language, territorial capacity and its own radicalism, but also episodes of conflict, public excess and distance from formal leadership.

6.3. Public relationship between Mario Silva and Valentín Santana

There is not enough open evidence to affirm a public friendship, formal alliance or stable coordination between Mario Silva and Valentín Santana. What appears in open sources is more ambiguous.

A cable published by WikiLeaks on 23 de Enero colectivos and internal tensions reports that, in 2008, demonstrators linked to 23 de Enero colectivos accused Mario Silva of being “counter-revolutionary.” That points more to tension than to organic alliance.

There is also a different clue: a Runrun profile of Santana, visible in search results, says that at some point an episode of La Hojilla was recorded from Block 7. That clue suggests political coexistence or media access at certain moments, but it does not allow one to conclude friendship or permanent alignment. The located source was Runrun on Valentín Santana as a candidate to the Constituent Assembly, although full access may present technical problems.

The most rigorous formulation for this report is this: Mario Silva and Valentín Santana share discursive zones of radical Chavismo, but there is not enough public documentation to affirm a current relationship of friendship, subordination or coordination. What is documented shows an irregular relationship, with signs of political coexistence, but also episodes of distance or criticism.

6.4. Recent clips and excerpts attributed to Valentín Santana

On the recent front, no formal interview or high-standard institutional statement appears, but there are clips and excerpts on social media that should be recorded as low-formality sources, useful for monitoring.

Among the leads found:

These pieces should not be treated as equivalent to an institutional primary source, but they are relevant for documenting the recent circulation of a political tone similar to Mario Silva’s: anti-American, anti-surrender, radical and oriented toward territorial or armed defense.

7. Other indications of a line similar to Mario Silva’s

The most important fact outside Silva and Santana is that Diosdado Cabello had to respond to internal Chavista criticism over Venezuela’s return to the IMF and the World Bank. Infobae’s coverage of criticism inside Chavismo over the return to the IMF indicates that the objection is not purely individual. The criticism was visible enough to generate a public response.

No other top-level military or civilian leader appears, with the same documentary level, to have formulated in recent days a line as extensive as Mario Silva’s. What can be stated is that there are at least three converging signals:

1. Mario Silva articulates the most systematic ideological criticism. 2. Valentín Santana / La Piedrita appears in recent excerpts with an anti-Yankee and anti-surrender line. 3. Internal criticism over the return to the IMF forces Diosdado Cabello to respond publicly.

This allows one to speak of a hard-line critical current or flank of radical unease, though not of a proven organized structure.

8. General political reading

The public sequence of this week leaves four clear layers.

First, Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez and Diosdado Cabello appear coordinated in a national street campaign against sanctions, with Delcy also adding announcements on the IMF, public assets and criminal justice.

Second, Mario Silva entered with a discourse that does not accompany that narrative of management and unity, but rather tensions it from the hard-left Chavista side: he denounces markets, the IMF, OFAC, pacts, “realpolitik,” concessions and U.S. tutelage.

Third, the replacement of Laura Dogu by John Barrett gives Silva a concrete name to which he can attribute this new phase of pressure.

Fourth, the context of Valentín Santana and La Piedrita shows that there is a radical Chavista periphery historically ambivalent toward formal power, capable of rhetorically coinciding with Silva’s criticism even though there is no open proof of coordination.

The most prudent conclusion is that there is a public confrontation of line inside Chavismo, although there is still not enough open evidence to speak of a formal structural rupture. The pilgrimage by Delcy/Jorge/Diosdado and Mario Silva’s program do not clash only in style; they clash in substance: one side is building legitimacy around sanctions, management, criminal justice consultation and unity; the other is saying that the real problem is ideological and strategic capitulation before the United States and that January 3 must be read as direct imperial aggression, not as “extremism” or as a simple operation attributable to María Corina Machado.

9. Information gaps

Sources

Delcy Rodríguez, Jorge Rodríguez, Diosdado Cabello and official agenda

John Barrett and the U.S. diplomatic replacement

Mario Silva

Valentín Santana, La Piedrita and colectivos

Recent low-formality leads on Valentín Santana

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About the author

Daniel Sardá is an SEO Specialist, a university-level technician in Foreign Trade from Universidad Simón Bolívar, and editor of Libertatis Venezuela. He writes on liberalism, political economy, institutions, propaganda and individual liberty from an independent, non-partisan perspective.

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