Fundamentals

General Laws: What They Are and Why They Limit Arbitrary Power

By Daniel Sardá · Published on September 23, 2026

6 min read1,254 words

A general law establishes rules for open classes of people or cases. That structure makes tailored privileges and punishments harder, but it does not by itself make a law just.

A general law establishes a rule for a class of people or situations, rather than an order designed for identified individuals. It may apply, for example, to people who drive vehicles, hire workers, or open businesses that meet certain conditions. It need not apply literally to everyone in order to be general.

That clarification matters because the phrase is easily misunderstood. A “general law” is not a universal law, nor is it another name for “general principles of law.” In its normative sense, generality chiefly describes how a rule identifies those to whom it applies: through categories capable of including an open plurality of cases.

The Pan-Hispanic Dictionary of Legal Spanish links a general law to a decision addressed to citizens at large rather than to particular people, and to an abstract formulation. This legislative form has institutional value: it makes it harder to use public power to impose burdens or grant advantages to people singled out in advance. But it is a partial safeguard, not a guarantee of justice.

Key idea: A law can be general without applying to every person. What matters is that it defines those affected through an open class, rather than by name or disguised equivalents.

Generality and abstraction: two related features

Although they often appear together, generality and abstraction do not mean exactly the same thing.

Generality concerns, above all, the people to whom a rule applies. A rule requiring a license for all establishments that prepare food regulates a class, even if it initially reaches only a few businesses in a small town.

Abstraction concerns the condition that triggers the rule. Rather than resolving one unique, unrepeatable event, the rule describes features that can recur: opening premises, exceeding a speed limit, or failing to meet a contractual obligation.

For that reason, the number of people or cases actually reached does not settle the question. A rule prompted by a concrete episode may still be general and abstract if its objective criteria cover future cases in the same class. Conversely, an impersonal-looking text may operate as a singular decision if its conditions are designed to identify only one predetermined case and its effect is exhausted there.

This latter distinction appears, within its specific legal context, in Judgment 48/2003 of Spain’s Constitutional Court. The court contrasts general and abstract rules with single-case laws, whose content and effect are exhausted in one particular measure. It is an example from the Spanish legal tradition, not a constitutional rule that applies identically in every country.

General law, special law, and individual decision

A special law regulates a subject, sector, or subclass more precisely than a general law. Yet “special” does not mean “individual.” A rule applying to all financial institutions can be special in relation to ordinary commercial law while still being general within its own field.

The relationship is often expressed by the maxim lex specialis derogat generali: where applicable, the more specific rule prevails over the general one. Speciality therefore describes the relationship between rules and their respective scope; it does not necessarily indicate a personal favor or sanction.

An individual decision, by contrast, applies a rule to specified people or facts. A fine, a license, or a judgment normally addresses identifiable recipients. That does not make it illegitimate: institutions need individual acts to apply general rules. The relevant questions are whether the decision rests on prior criteria and whether it can be reviewed.

Key idea: A general law states the criterion; an individual decision applies it to a case. The problem arises when power invents the criterion after choosing whom to benefit or burden.

An example: the prior rule and the targeted order

Suppose an authority requires safety measures for every establishment open to the public above a specified capacity. The rule uses verifiable conditions, known in advance, and applicable to any present or future premises in that class.

If a business fails to comply, an administrative decision may require it to correct the deficiencies or temporarily suspend its operations. That decision is individual, yet it can be a legitimate application of the general rule.

The situation changes if the authority decides to close an identified business and then drafts an artificial condition that only that business can meet or fail to meet. Even if the text avoids naming it, its structure may reveal a measure tailored to its recipient. Grammatical generality is not enough: the objectivity of the criterion, the openness of the class, and the possibility of review also matter.

A precise sector-specific regulation is not necessarily arbitrary: different activities may require different rules. The risk lies in classifying without a relevant public reason, or in manipulating a category to achieve a personal result.

They are not “general principles of law”

General principles of law belong to a different category. Depending on the legal system, they may help ground, interpret, or complete the law when a written rule does not by itself provide a sufficient answer. Equality, good faith, or a prohibition on abuse may operate as principles in certain systems and with differing scope.

A general law, by contrast, is a provision enacted by a competent authority and addressed to a class of people or cases. Principles may guide its interpretation or call its application into question, but they should not be confused with it. The verbal similarity between the expressions conceals different legal functions.

Why generality helps limit power

General rules make it harder for those who govern to use law as an instrument of personal reward or retaliation. When the same condition applies to an open class, the lawmaker must formulate a reason that can be stated publicly and extended to similar cases. This supports formal equality and reduces a measure of discretion.

It can also improve predictability. People can organize their decisions more effectively when they know in advance the conditions and consequences of a rule. This connection does not depend on generality alone: the law must also be accessible, understandable, relatively stable, and consistently applied. These are demands associated with legal certainty and the rule of law.

In its Rule of Law Checklist, the Venice Commission links legal certainty to accessible and predictable laws and stresses the need for legal limits on public discretion. Generality contributes to those conditions, but does not create them on its own.

Key idea: Generality does not mean neutrality, justice, or constitutionality. A rule formulated for a class may rely on a discriminatory classification or impose disproportionate burdens.

A necessary, but insufficient, condition

A general law can have highly unequal effects. It can also restrict liberty, protect privileged interests through apparently neutral categories, or leave discretion so broad that it barely constrains the authority. Meeting the general form does not cure those defects.

That is why it is useful to distinguish legality from government under laws. It matters that official action has a legal basis, but a genuine limit on power also requires public and predictable rules, equality in application, independent checks, and avenues for challenging abuse.

Even with those limits, generality retains an important function: it requires power to be justified through criteria capable of governing similar cases. The decisive institutional difference is simple. First, a rule is established for an open class; then it is applied to each case. When the process is reversed and the recipient is chosen first, law risks becoming a personal order dressed up as a rule.